Corporate Characteristics and Influence on Share Based Payment of Financial Service Firms in Nigeria
This investigates the effect of corporate characteristics on share base payment of financial service industry in Nigeria. Objective of the study is to if internal factors affects share base payments of corporate organizations in Nigeria. We analyzed five commercial banks and five insurance firms that are quoted on the floor of Nigerian Stock Exchange. Technique adopted for sampling adopted is convenience sampling. As the nature of data is panel therefore, pooled regression, fixed and random effect tests are run. Random effect results are focused after applying Hausman’s test. From the fixed effect model, tangibility, risk, management efficiency, debt equity ratio, corporate governance and cost of capital have negative but insignificant effects while return on investment, liquidity and firm size have positive and insignificant effect on share base payment. We conclude that corporate characteristics does not significantly influence share base payment of the selected financial service firms. We therefore recommend that the use of share base payment should be integrated with the corporate structure such as ownership structure, capital structure and others.
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